Re: [TLS] (crypto agility may benefit from private extensions) Re: Additional changes for draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates

Alex C <immibis@gmail.com> Sat, 24 March 2018 06:20 UTC

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From: Alex C <immibis@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 24 Mar 2018 19:20:21 +1300
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] (crypto agility may benefit from private extensions) Re: Additional changes for draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates
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I'm hesitant to call a 16-bit registry "big" in any context.
But if allocating a value requires a specification, that's probably okay.
(There aren't even close to 2^16 RFCs in total)

On Wed, Mar 21, 2018 at 3:54 AM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>; wrote:

>
>
> On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 2:51 PM, Rene Struik <rstruik.ext@gmail.com>;
> wrote:
>
>> Hi Sean:
>>
>> Quick question: does "closing the registry" not contradict catering
>> towards crypto agility? What happens if, say, one wishes to add another
>> signature scheme, besides Ed25519, to the mix. If there is no private
>> field, does this mean that, e.g., Schnorr+BSI Brainpool256r1 is now ruled
>> out?
>>
>
> No. Private just means "we're not going to allocate these code points, so
> you should use them without coordination".
>
> The key point here is that this is a big space and so we're instead going
> to make it easy for people to reserve code points by writing a stable spec,
> that need not be an IETF standard, and that's what they should do.
>
>
> -Ekr
>
>
>>
>> My more serious concern is, however, that if the Private Use case is
>> "verboten", there is no chance for people to signal private extensions
>> (since IETF will just have killed this off).
>>
>> I do not think it is prudent to have a slow process in place (IETF
>> standardization) to effectuate crypto agility, if private use can already
>> do this without waiting for 3-year public discussions and heated debate (if
>> a weakness is discovered, dark forces will exploit this right away and
>> won't wait for IETF to catch up to exploit an issue).
>>
>> As case in point, suppose US Gov't wants to roll its own "Suite A"
>> scheme, or if one wants to use TLS with something tailored towards the
>> sensor world (which operates in quite a hostile environment for
>> implementation security), how is one going to do this in context of TLS if
>> the signaling required has just been removed?
>>
>> NOTE: this is not an invite for endless discussions on the legitimacy of
>> whoever may wish a private extensions (it is private after all), it does
>> question though the wisdom of removing the option for using this. If Zulu
>> hour arrives, one should have tools to act...
>>
>> Best regards, Rene
>>
>> On 3/16/2018 10:01 AM, Sean Turner wrote:
>> > During Adam Roach’s AD review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13, he noted
>> something about the HashAlgorithm and that made me go look at what was said
>> in draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates.  Turns out that 4492bis
>> assigned some values draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates was marking as
>> reserved.  I have fixed that up in:
>> > https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates/pull/65
>> >
>> > One further point brought out in discussions with Adam was that if
>> we’re really closing the HashAlgorithm and SignatureAlgorithms registry we
>> need to also mark 224-255 as deprecated.  Currently these are marked as
>> Reserved for Private Use.  So the question is should we mark 224-255 as
>> deprecated in these two registries?
>> >
>> > spt
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > TLS mailing list
>> > TLS@ietf.org
>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>>
>> --
>> email: rstruik.ext@gmail.com | Skype: rstruik
>> cell: +1 (647) 867-5658 | US: +1 (415) 690-7363
>>
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>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>
>
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