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[TLS] Drafts for batch signing and PKCS#1 v1.5

David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> Tue, 30 July 2019 00:16 UTC

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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2019 20:15:44 -0400
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Subject: [TLS] Drafts for batch signing and PKCS#1 v1.5
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Hi all,

I’ve just uploaded a pair of drafts relating to signatures in TLS 1.3.
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-davidben-tls13-pkcs1-00
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-davidben-tls-batch-signing-00

The first introduces optional legacy codepoints for PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures
with client certificates. This is unfortunate, but I think we should do it.
On the Chrome side, we’ve encountered some headaches with the TLS 1.3 PSS
requirement which are unique to client certificates. The document describes
the motivations in detail.

The second describes a batch signing mechanism for TLS using Merkle trees.
It allows TLS clients and servers to better handle signing load. I think it
could be beneficial for a number of DoS and remote key scenarios.

Thoughts?

David

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