IETF Logo Mail Archive

[TLS] Using RSA PSS in TLS

Johannes Merkle <johannes.merkle@secunet.com> Mon, 14 October 2013 08:39 UTC

Return-Path: <Johannes.Merkle@secunet.com>
X-Original-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 02E2521E815A for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Oct 2013 01:39:39 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -3.599
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id EyRDbzZ4wYDw for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 14 Oct 2013 01:39:33 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from a.mx.secunet.com (a.mx.secunet.com [195.81.216.161]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B6EB921E8149 for <tls@ietf.org>; Mon, 14 Oct 2013 01:39:29 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from localhost (alg1 [127.0.0.1]) by a.mx.secunet.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D47231A0071 for <tls@ietf.org>; Mon, 14 Oct 2013 10:39:28 +0200 (CEST)
X-Virus-Scanned: by secunet
Received: from a.mx.secunet.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (a.mx.secunet.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with LMTP id YzKp3kflY0pv for <tls@ietf.org>; Mon, 14 Oct 2013 10:39:27 +0200 (CEST)
Received: from mail-srv1.secumail.de (unknown [10.53.40.200]) by a.mx.secunet.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CE5901A006C for <tls@ietf.org>; Mon, 14 Oct 2013 10:39:27 +0200 (CEST)
Received: from [172.16.40.201] ([172.16.40.201]) by mail-srv1.secumail.de with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.4675); Mon, 14 Oct 2013 10:39:27 +0200
Message-ID: <525BADBD.8020007@secunet.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2013 10:39:25 +0200
From: Johannes Merkle <johannes.merkle@secunet.com>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:17.0) Gecko/20130801 Thunderbird/17.0.8
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
X-Enigmail-Version: 1.5.2
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-15
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 14 Oct 2013 08:39:28.0042 (UTC) FILETIME=[E4EA48A0:01CEC8B8]
Subject: [TLS] Using RSA PSS in TLS
X-BeenThere: tls@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls>
List-Post: <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2013 08:39:39 -0000

While the current discussion on this list is about ECC, I would like to raise the question if it were not desirable to
allow usage of provably secure RSA-PSS signatures from PKCS#1v2.1 in TLS.

Of course, an issue with this idea is that, if we replace DHE_RSA and ECDHE_RSA with DHE_PSS and ECDHE_PSS, we end up
with a whole bunch of new cipher suites. An alternative could be a new extension signaling the RSA version used (with
PKCS#1v1.5 as default).

Any thoughts on that?
-- 
Johannes

v2.2.1 | Report a Bug | By Email