Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA key Transport from TLS 1.3
Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net> Wed, 26 March 2014 19:31 UTC
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Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:30:59 -0700
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From: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>
To: "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey@cisco.com>
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Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA key Transport from TLS 1.3
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Hi Joe, Could you explain what the process for TLS 1.3 is? It seems like you want the group to start making lots of small, specific decisions. I'm not convinced that's the best way to design a complex protocol with lots of inter-related pieces. I was hoping we'd have some discussion on the TLS 1.3 process, now that the charter is approved. Is that not going to happen? Trevor On Wed, Mar 26, 2014 at 11:43 AM, Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) <jsalowey@cisco.com> wrote: > TLS has had cipher suites based on RSA key transport (aka "static RSA", TLS_RSA_WITH_*) since the days of SSL 2.0. These cipher suites have several drawbacks including lack of PFS, pre-master secret contributed only by the client, and the general weakening of RSA over time. It would make the security analysis simpler to remove this option from TLS 1.3. RSA certificates would still be allowed, but the key establishment would be via DHE or ECDHE. The consensus in the room at IETF-89 was to remove RSA key transport from TLS 1.3. If you have concerns about this decision please respond on the TLS list by April 11, 2014. > > Thanks, > > Joe > [Speaking for the TLS chairs] > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
- [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA key Tr… Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
- [TLS] On axing DHE (was: Re: Confirming Consensus… Rene Struik
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Trevor Perrin
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Santosh Chokhani
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Hanno Böck
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Jack Lloyd
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Alyssa Rowan
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Paul Bakker
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Alyssa Rowan
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Hanno Böck
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Johannes Merkle
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Paul Bakker
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Andy Lutomirski
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- [TLS] Negotiated Discrete Log DHE revision [was: … Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Negotiated Discrete Log DHE revision [w… Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] Negotiated Discrete Log DHE revision Michael D'Errico
- Re: [TLS] Negotiated Discrete Log DHE revision Henrick Hellström
- Re: [TLS] Negotiated Discrete Log DHE revision [w… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Negotiated Discrete Log DHE revision Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Negotiated Discrete Log DHE revision Samuel Neves
- Re: [TLS] Negotiated Discrete Log DHE revision Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Negotiated Discrete Log DHE revision Samuel Neves
- Re: [TLS] Negotiated Discrete Log DHE revision Liz meeks
- Re: [TLS] Negotiated Discrete Log DHE revision [w… Fedor Brunner
- Re: [TLS] Negotiated Discrete Log DHE revision [w… Fedor Brunner
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Kurt Roeckx
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Kurt Roeckx
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA ke… Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos