Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS for enterprise "visibility" (don't do it)

Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> Sat, 24 March 2018 15:56 UTC

Return-Path: <jim@rfc1035.com>
X-Original-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D413312D7EC for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 24 Mar 2018 08:56:29 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.91
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.91 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.01] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ohu1c20ZQRod for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 24 Mar 2018 08:56:28 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from shaun.rfc1035.com (smtp.v6.rfc1035.com [IPv6:2001:4b10:100:7::25]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 65A6312D7E8 for <tls@ietf.org>; Sat, 24 Mar 2018 08:56:28 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from gromit.rfc1035.com (gromit.rfc1035.com [195.54.233.69]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by shaun.rfc1035.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B96E3242147B; Sat, 24 Mar 2018 15:56:26 +0000 (UTC)
From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Message-Id: <C10CBF34-E75D-4DB6-8DCA-D54FB069D4A2@rfc1035.com>
Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="Apple-Mail=_16A81634-B8DE-47C0-AFBB-8EF88028135B"; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; micalg=pgp-sha256
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 11.2 \(3445.5.20\))
Date: Sat, 24 Mar 2018 15:56:25 +0000
In-Reply-To: <810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF501C45B43@XMB116CNC.rim.net>
Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
To: Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com>
References: <810C31990B57ED40B2062BA10D43FBF501C45B43@XMB116CNC.rim.net>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3445.5.20)
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/Q7e5Kj8txkQ_7kwJD3jDAt8wPbw>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Breaking into TLS for enterprise "visibility" (don't do it)
X-BeenThere: tls@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22
Precedence: list
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls/>
List-Post: <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 24 Mar 2018 15:56:30 -0000


> On 19 Mar 2018, at 15:18, Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com>; wrote:
> 
> PS: I never directly worked on enterprise security (usually, I just think about the math of basic crypto primitives), but I don't recall hearing about such a "visibility" feature in the enterprise security work of colleagues (whom I do _not_ speak for), e.g. one system used forward-secure ECMQV to establish a connection between smartphones and the enterprise network.

Hearsay anecdote is not evidence. :-)

There are use cases in enterprise networks, notably in banking and finance. Some of these were presented to the TLS WG. [See Steve Fenter’s presentation at IETF97.] However the WG did not reach consensus on adopting the relevant drafts as work items.