[TLS] AD review of draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-04

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Thu, 10 March 2016 19:42 UTC

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Subject: [TLS] AD review of draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-04
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This is ready to go but I've one question. Sorry I don't
recall if this was discussed previously, if it was, then
just say and I'll move this along to IETF LC.

My question is: Should the WG take the opportunity to more
tightly define the key exchange parameters for these

For example, TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 could
REQUIRE RSA keys with >=2048 bit moduli and one could go
further and say that this also REQUIRES use of specific
integer DH groups. Etc etc.  Getting all that agreed might
take a wee while, so if the answer is "nah, no thanks, we don't
want to do that here," that's fine and I'll just start IETF
LC.  I guess another way to handle that might be to say that
these ciphersuites REQUIRE that all relevant restrictions
from BCP195 be enforced. That'd maybe ensure the public key
stuff is all at good strength, but doing so might not be so
effective, in terms of trying to ensure these ciphersuites
aren't used with e.g. short RSA keys.

Whatchacha think?