[TLS] Re: WG Adoption Call for Use of ML-DSA in TLS 1.3

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Wed, 16 April 2025 02:01 UTC

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Date: Wed, 16 Apr 2025 12:01:44 +1000
From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: [TLS] Re: WG Adoption Call for Use of ML-DSA in TLS 1.3
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On Tue, Apr 15, 2025 at 01:55:35PM -0700, Andrey Jivsov wrote:

> I don't think that standalone ML-DSA should be adopted.
> 
> There is time to move to a non-hybrid X.509 and digital signatures in the
> future.
> 
> This topic has implications to availability of X.509 certificates, as
> there is a real risk that CAs will prefer standalone ML-DSA to the
> exclusion of hybrids, and also that other protocols will be limited to
> standalone ML-DSA.

But CAs do not choose EE keys, the key in the CSR is chosen by users.
And CAs can start to use ML-DSA to self-sign trust-anchor certs or sign
intermediate issuer (subordinate CA if you prefer that term)
certificates whether or not ML-DSA is a defined signature algorithm in
TLS.

I support adoption, will review, and don't see a compelling reason to
delay adoption.  Are we likely to produce a materially different spec
if this is delayed and for how long?

-- 
    Viktor.

$ posttls-finger -c -Lsummary dukhovni.org
posttls-finger: Verified TLS connection established
    ... TLSv1.3 with cipher
    TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits)
    key-exchange X25519MLKEM768
    server-signature ML-DSA-65 (raw public key)