Re: [TLS] Un-deprecating everything TLS 1.2

Christopher Patton <cpatton@cloudflare.com> Mon, 05 October 2020 14:21 UTC

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From: Christopher Patton <cpatton@cloudflare.com>
Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2020 07:21:28 -0700
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To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: "Michael D'Errico" <mike-list@pobox.com>, TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Un-deprecating everything TLS 1.2
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A couple pointers for getting started:

   1. Check out Dowling et al.'s recent analysis. Published a month or so
   ago, it's the most recent proof of security of the full handshake (also
   includes PSK modes): https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1044
   2. Check out Paterson and van der Merwe's survey of the body of papers
   that helped to shape TLS 1.3. It also overviews the myriad attacks against
   TLS 1.2 and below that catalyzed a more proactive design approach for 1.3:
   https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-49100-4_7

If you're unable to download the second (2.), the same paper appears in a
slightly different form in van der Merwe's PhD thesis.

No analysis is perfect, but so far, 1.3 appears to be far superior to
1.0-1.2.

Best,
Chris P.