[TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSLKEYLOGFILE Format for TLS
David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> Fri, 07 February 2025 18:55 UTC
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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Fri, 07 Feb 2025 13:55:24 -0500
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To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
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CC: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSLKEYLOGFILE Format for TLS
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Accepting both labels gets super messy because then we have to make a bunch of decisions like whether you output both labels on the logging side. But we can just do a bit of research here: - In IETF land, EARLY_EXPORTER_MASTER_SECRET dates to the start of the I-D, but... - The shorter EXPORTER_SECRET name for the non-early secret dates to the earliest proposals for TLS 1.3 here: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1287711 - BoringSSL does not output this label - OpenSSL does not output this label - NSS outputs this label but uses EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET - Wireshark consumes this label but uses EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET So I think EARLY_EXPORTER_MASTER_SECRET was just a typo and should always have been EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET. Unless there's any evidence that someone actually relies on the EARLY_EXPORTER_MASTER_SECRET label (very, very unlikely given both the history of early exporters and the history of this SSLKEYLOGFILE integration), I think the answer is clear: No, we should not accept both labels. We should simply fix it to say EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET and move on. David On Fri, Feb 7, 2025 at 1:33 PM Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote: > The question is really "should we accept both names?" > >
- [TLS] 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSLKEYL… Sean Turner
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Salz, Rich
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… David Benjamin
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Salz, Rich
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… David Benjamin
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… David Benjamin
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Salz, Rich
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Sean Turner
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Salz, Rich
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… David Benjamin
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Stephen Farrell
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Bellebaum, Thomas
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Ben Smyth
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Bellebaum, Thomas
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Stephen Farrell
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Salz, Rich
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Bellebaum, Thomas
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Ben Smyth
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Bellebaum, Thomas
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Andrei Popov
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… _ _
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Martin Thomson
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Stephen Farrell
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… David Adrian
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Alicja Kario
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Christian Huitema
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Muhammad Usama Sardar
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Aaron Zauner (azet)
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Arnaud Taddei
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Achim Kraus
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Bellebaum, Thomas
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… S Moonesamy
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Alicja Kario
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Alicja Kario
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Aaron Zauner
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Aaron Zauner
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Martin Thomson
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Aaron Zauner
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Arnaud Taddei
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: 2nd Working Group Last C… Yaakov Stein
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Arnaud Taddei
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Stephen Farrell
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: 2nd Working Group Last C… Andrei Popov
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] 2nd Working Group Last Call … Alicja Kario
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Salz, Rich
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Arnaud Taddei
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Ilari Liusvaara
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Ben Smyth