[TLS] Integrity bounds in DTLS

Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net> Fri, 01 May 2020 04:51 UTC

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Date: Fri, 01 May 2020 14:51:11 +1000
From: Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>
To: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: [TLS] Integrity bounds in DTLS
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Thanks to some good work from Felix Günther, Marc Fischlin, Christian Janson, and Kenny Paterson we now have a new result to share about the integrity limits in QUIC.

There is a long write-up in https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/issues/3619, the conclusion of which is that endpoints need to count the number of failed decryptions and stop using keys once a certain limit is reached.  Key updates can be used to avoid this.

The same concern applies to DTLS.  I believe that the same solution - or at least a similar solution - is therefore necessary for DTLS.

I know that we're past WGLC, but this is an important result regarding a key distinction between TLS and DTLS.