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Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3

Aaron Zauner <azet@azet.org> Thu, 22 January 2015 16:47 UTC

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Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2015 17:47:28 +0100
From: Aaron Zauner <azet@azet.org>
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To: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
References: <54B5501A.4070402@azet.org> <20150120191819.GA8165@typhoon.azet.org> <20150120193412.GA10140@typhoon.azet.org> <CABkgnnWSNtREGMYoT9nL9WWas5TZGqnW=qEcg9h_WvzMr8U8KQ@mail.gmail.com> <20150120225335.GA871@typhoon.azet.org> <CABkgnnWbFciZD=ja2bD+tZfFnniWWm=5zH5kL1x_UQEa4rbQ8w@mail.gmail.com> <20150121004704.GA15203@typhoon.azet.org> <54BFC326.4010302@azet.org> <CABcZeBMcsr7bnw8UmxesWC5fdiV==ZgfqoTYa-AmBmX6v5mKpw@mail.gmail.com> <20150121165008.GQ2350@localhost> <54BFDAD1.6050403@azet.org> <1421915855.2723.52.camel@redhat.com>
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Cc: TLS Mailing List <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3
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Hi Nikos,

Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote:
> It will not. However, there will be no PFS fallback if for some reason
> there is some attack on ECDHE that is not applicable on DHE. In any case
> I don't find the issue critical. Even if removed it's only 2
> ciphersuites saved, and we are nowhere close to believing that the
> ciphersuite space is close to an end.

Yes I agree. The issue I see is that confined/embedded might not have
DHE as fallback in any case, because they probably opt to not support it
because if plattform constraints. And as far as I understand PSK is
exactly there for these use-cases. It would be really good to have
someone doing TLS crypto in the embedded world comment on this topic.
I've done embedded development but nothing that touched TLS so far.

That being said: You're right. I'd much rather have it in there than
have no fallback.

Aaron

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