Re: [TLS] Sabotage?

Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> Sat, 12 September 2020 21:05 UTC

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From: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Sat, 12 Sep 2020 17:04:56 -0400
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To: Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Sabotage?
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Hi Mike,

This is a pretty big topic that’s been explored quite a bit.  The long term impact of these changes could be very positive.  I just published a book on the topic of embracing E2E among other topics after exploring the impact on operators in RFC8404.  In other words, both directions were explored to reach a possible way forward with increased security and how to get the control/visibility in order to embrace these changes.  

I’m happy to talk more, but fear the length of a thread on this list and may not keep up with it given my current workload.

Best regards,
Kathleen 

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> On Sep 12, 2020, at 11:07 AM, Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com> wrote:
> 
> Hi,
> 
> I get a weird feeling that the internet is being hijacked and soon it will be impossible to reverse course.  I have not followed the development of TLS 1.3 but it seems very different from TLS 1.2. Also TLS 1.2 is very different from TLS 1.0/1.1 (which are being deprecated).  QUIC looked good at a glance, but it seems to rely on TLS to share key material, and also I'm more than a bit concerned about its capability to track users.
> 
> Then there's Zoom video conferencing, where everybody working from home or in virtual school has an audio and video feed streaming to their servers.  Github is owned by Microsoft with some dire consequences.  Lots of large companies trying to be everything to everyone, and it turns out they're cruel.
> 
> Anyone?
> 
> Mike
> 
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