Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA should die

[Viktor Dukhovni <[e-mail]>]

On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 03:06:23AM +0000, Salz, Rich wrote:

> > Here's one (granted, contrived) policy:
> 
> Or, say, you're hosting those kinds of organizations.
> 
> Not contrived at all.

It suffices for clients to not offer building blocks they don't
implement.  If servers choose to "bundle" certain algorithms, that's
fine, so long as clients don't object to what they get.

Picky clients can offer a smaller cross-product.  Suite-B restrictions
IIRC are triggered in part by certificate content, which in turn
is selected via SNI.

I am sure we can find corner cases where legacy TLS implementations
warts and all needed various exclusions.  If TLS 1.3 clients can
only express cross-product suites, servers may be able to pick up
the slack as appropriate.

We need to be sure that the objections are really future requirements
for 1.3, rather than work-arounds for legacy 1.2 and older stacks
whose defects are not expected to be carried forward into 1.3.

That said, finally we're finding plausible cases in which ala carte
is less flexible.  Are these sufficiently compelling?

-- 
	Viktor.