Re: [TLS] Last Call: RFC 2818 (HTTP Over TLS) to Proposed Standard

mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex) Fri, 01 June 2012 17:44 UTC

Return-Path: <mrex@sap.com>
X-Original-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CD80D21F8A5B; Fri, 1 Jun 2012 10:44:25 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -10.184
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.184 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.065, BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_EQ_DE=0.35, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id FLWVeteiYRBs; Fri, 1 Jun 2012 10:44:25 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtpde01.sap-ag.de (smtpde01.sap-ag.de [155.56.68.170]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 12F1E21F8A5A; Fri, 1 Jun 2012 10:44:24 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail.sap.corp by smtpde01.sap-ag.de (26) with ESMTP id q51HiNQq026206 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL); Fri, 1 Jun 2012 19:44:23 +0200 (MEST)
In-Reply-To: <h2xiky0n69l6ckp3djjezwJv4X.penango@mail.gmail.com>
To: Kyle Hamilton <aerowolf@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 01 Jun 2012 19:44:22 +0200
X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4ME+ PL125 (25)]
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
Message-Id: <20120601174422.CFC9B1A094@ld9781.wdf.sap.corp>
From: mrex@sap.com
X-SAP: out
Cc: IESG Secretary <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>, tls@ietf.org, IETF Announcement List <ietf-announce@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Last Call: RFC 2818 (HTTP Over TLS) to Proposed Standard
X-BeenThere: tls@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
Reply-To: mrex@sap.com
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls>
List-Post: <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 01 Jun 2012 17:44:26 -0000

Kyle Hamilton wrote:
> This is damaging, and I recommend against.  This is something which must
> be handled by HTTP and its demands of its transports, not TLS and its
> claim to support what it thinks its clients want.
> 
> Among other things, this RFC more than any other is responsible for the
> "Server Name Indication" requirement.  If it had not been the case,
> SNI would never have been necessary, and IESG/IETF would never have
> had to deal with it.

The RFC(s) responsible for the "Server Name Indication" requirement is/are
2068/2616 "HTTP/1.1", which introduced the concept of virtual hosting:

  http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2068#section-14.23
  http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2616#section-14.23


> 
> I suggest instead that it be moved to HISTORIC, and a 2818bis drafted
> which describes how the various TLS extensions play with HTTP.

While I would be OK with creating rfc2818bis that explicitly describes
additional requirements implied by the virtual hosting concept of HTTP/1.1
and refers to TLS extension SNI rfc4366 (for TLSv1.0+v1.1) and
rfc6066 (for TLSv1.2+),  I fail to see why we should move rfc2818
to historic _before_ such a 2818bis is ready for publication.


-Martin