[TLS] Opsdir telechat review of draft-ietf-tls-record-limit-02

Éric Vyncke <evyncke@cisco.com> Wed, 21 February 2018 13:46 UTC

Return-Path: <evyncke@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: tls@ietf.org
Delivered-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from ietfa.amsl.com (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E3B1A12778D; Wed, 21 Feb 2018 05:46:13 -0800 (PST)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
From: Éric Vyncke <evyncke@cisco.com>
To: ops-dir@ietf.org
Cc: tls@ietf.org, ietf@ietf.org, draft-ietf-tls-record-limit.all@ietf.org
X-Test-IDTracker: no
X-IETF-IDTracker: 6.72.2
Auto-Submitted: auto-generated
Precedence: bulk
Message-ID: <151922077388.9603.11906306194638042902@ietfa.amsl.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Feb 2018 05:46:13 -0800
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/RPJOlYzZ0gH5niFmoH-OMKCCr7U>
Subject: [TLS] Opsdir telechat review of draft-ietf-tls-record-limit-02
X-BeenThere: tls@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls/>
List-Post: <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 21 Feb 2018 13:46:14 -0000

Reviewer: Éric Vyncke
Review result: Has Nits

Reviewer: Eric Vyncke
Review results: has nits

Hello Martin,

I have reviewed this document as part of the Operational directorate's ongoing
effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments
were written with the intent of improving the operational aspects of the IETF
drafts.

The document is about an extension to TLS (record_size_limit) allowing
endpoints to negotiate the maximum size of protected records. The document also
deprecates a previous extension max_fragment_length.

The different scenarios (whether endpoints support this option or not) as well
as behavior of future versions of TLS are specified. Section 5 also describes
the behavior when endpoints use the proposed and the deprecated TLS options.

Nits in section 5: "MUST ignore *and* "max_fragment_length""

This is a short document and IMHO all operational issues are well documented
and correct.

-éric