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Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension?

Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> Fri, 27 November 2009 15:27 UTC

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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: ekr@networkresonance.com
Date: Fri, 27 Nov 2009 16:27:03 +0100
In-Reply-To: <20091127151113.BDEF16C3795@kilo.networkresonance.com> from "Eric Rescorla" at Nov 27, 9 07:11:12 am
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Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Verify data in the RI extension?
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Eric Rescorla wrote:
> 
> I also share David Hopwood's concern about ambiguity in the handshake
> hashes stream created by having data which is not properly formatted
> injected into the hash
> (http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg04857.html),
> so I don't think the particular approach in Martin's draft is
> really satisfactory.

That problem can be trivially fixed.

We just memorize the non-encrypted Client.Finished and Server.Finished
handshake messages in full, rather then just the contained verify_data.


-Martin

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