Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligations
Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Thu, 01 September 2016 21:20 UTC
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 01 Sep 2016 14:20:02 -0700
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To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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Cc: IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligations
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On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 2:09 PM, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> wrote: > On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at 12:55:29PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote: > > I have created a PR for this at: > > https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/611 > > > > As it seems there was rough consensus for this change, I will merge this > > weekend > > absent some violent objections or direction to the contrary from the > chairs. > > > > -Ekr > > I tried to implement this, and discovered an issue: > > The client handshake traffic secret is needed for deriving client > Finished, and client application traffic secret is only needed after > that point. However, the derivation of client application traffic > secret uses handshake hash post Server Finished. > > So you either need to buffer the handshake hash value, or have two > overlapping client traffic secrets. > > Changing the client application traffic secret context to extend > up to Client Finished would solve the issue. > Hmm.... having the keys in one direction cover the client's certificate and certverify and the keys in the other direction not seems pretty sketchy. As I understand this, it's just an aesthetic issue, right? -Ekr > > Additionally: > - That would make the implementation look nicely symmetric > - Would also prevent having "not yet" keys. One can derive keys > from present state and install them immediately. > > > > -Ilari >
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Keith Winstein
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Keith Winstein
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Adam Langley
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Keith Winstein
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Adam Langley
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Keith Winstein
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Adam Langley
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Keith Winstein
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Jim Schaad
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Adam Langley
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… David Benjamin
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Keith Winstein
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… David Benjamin
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Keith Winstein
- [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligations David Benjamin
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Subodh Iyengar
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Judson Wilson
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Keith Winstein
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Keith Winstein
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Adam Langley
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Russ Housley
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Keith Winstein
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… David Benjamin
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] KeyUpdate and unbounded write obligatio… Keith Winstein