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Re: [TLS] datacenter TLS decryption as a three-party protocol

"Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com> Wed, 19 July 2017 21:25 UTC

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net>, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
CC: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] datacenter TLS decryption as a three-party protocol
Thread-Index: AQHTAJBchz4bEuxe60uC+rbloxSHrKJbn/OAgAACkwCAAAm5AIAAAWoAgAAB0ID///oQUA==
Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2017 21:25:17 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] datacenter TLS decryption as a three-party protocol
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> I find this a very bizarre outcome that works against our collective goals. If there is no mechanism at all, then it is quite likely that organizations will use static-DH or stay on TLS1.2. Those are bad options, in my opinion, because there's no signaling or opt-in to the client. We can do much better than that. 

If an organization needs to decrypt the network traffic, then it should probably continue to use a scheme that has a static key so that it can do that.

At least for the next three years.

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