[TLS] Re: Feedback on draft-bmw-tls-pake13-01.txt

Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com> Mon, 17 March 2025 16:22 UTC

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From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 2025 09:21:53 -0700
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Subject: [TLS] Re: Feedback on draft-bmw-tls-pake13-01.txt
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On Mon, Mar 17, 2025 at 8:49 AM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Mon, Mar 17, 2025 at 8:37 AM Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On Sun, Mar 16, 2025 at 7:52 PM David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> I'd also add that, *if* we want something PAKE-shaped in a web-like
>>> context, I don't think TLS-PAKE is a good fit for it. (Which is fine! Not
>>> everything needs to be for every use case.)
>>>
>>
>> Yes, I was thinking of mobile phone sign-in use cases. I think web
>> browsers could also offer "native" sign-in UI for people that want to use
>> it. It wouldn't be much different from my bank iOS app that lets me sign in
>> with FaceID. This kind of thing:
>>
>>
>> https://developer.apple.com/documentation/sign_in_with_apple/authenticating-users-with-sign-in-with-apple
>>
>
> The current workflow is that the user goes to example.com, which prompts
> them for their password. They then type their password into some form.
>

Yes, this is the current experience.


> With PAKE, what we want them to do is at this point to instead type it into
> some browser affordance, so that the site never sees the password.
>

Well, with that flow above, the user doesn't type their password. It looks
like this:
https://youtu.be/TmS66WNL1GE?si=pkEcjcPg1YdnDbSb&t=196


> As I
> said previously, this is technically straightforward but also phishable
> because
> training users to only type the password into the browser chrome is very
> difficult.
>
> Can you explain specifically the experience you have in mind that you think
> would avoid that risk?
>

In that ladder diagram in the link above, both sides have enough
information to bootstrap a PAKE, but the acronym is a bit of a misnomer in
this case. So, the PAKE registration process is the existing "Sign In /
Sign Up" feature. Then that data is used in the TLS handshake, but you only
need an identifier in the ClientHello to get started, because you've
verified their tokens during registration. This way is much less general
than this draft, and assumes that kind of sign-in flow. But, it's a pretty
popular pattern.

thanks,
Rob