Re: [TLS] the idea of using multiple keys with multiple certificate authorities in a TLS session.

You ideas seem to be based on TLS 1.2 and earlier.  In TLS 1.3, Ephemeral DH or Ephemeral ECDH will be used to produce the session key.  The ephemeral key will be signed, and a public key from the certificate will be used to validate the signature.  This approach offers much better forward secrecy.

Russ

On 05 Feb 2015, at 10:17, Shahin Noursalehi <mixoftix@gmail.com> wrote:

> Dear Sir/Madam,
> 
> Refer to discussions around TLS 1.3 in Linkedin group "Cryptographers
> and Cryptanalysts", contributor experts agree on the idea of using
> multiple keys with multiple certificate authorities in a TLS session.
> So if one certificate authority is compromised hopefully the others
> are not. The suggested solution would be like the process bellow:
> 
> Refer to the way that TLS generates the *master_secret*:
> 
> master_secret = PseudoRandomFunction(pre_master_secret, "master
> secret", ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random)
> 
> We could generate multiple peer-to-peer pre_master_secret(s) for each
> public-key that we receive from the server and XOR them all together.
> So, our offered method of calculation of master_secret will convert
> to:
> 
> master_secret = PseudoRandomFunction(multiple_pre_master_secret,
> "master secret", ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random)
> 
> where:
> 
> multiple_pre_master_secret = XOR(pre_master_secret_1,
> pre_master_secret_2, .. pre_master_secret_n)
> 
> and aim at preventing basic attacks that are known against
> one-time-pad, we could add a circular-bit-rotation(m) to the
> calculation above - each time we do an XOR:
> 
> multiple_pre_master_secret = ROT(XOR(pre_master_secret_1,
> pre_master_secret_2, .. pre_master_secret_n), m)
> 
> Please let us know about your point of views, then we could continue
> discussing the TLS.
> 
> With best regards
> 
> Shahin Noursalehi
> 
> 
> Reference:
> 
> https://www.linkedin.com/groups/what-are-new-methods-attack-3901854.S.5958888203401314306
> 
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