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[TLS] Make DANE-TLS (RFC 6698) mandatory for TLS

"Rene 'Renne' Bartsch, B.Sc. Informatics" <ietf@bartschnet.de> Mon, 15 October 2018 20:20 UTC

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To: tls@ietf.org
From: "Rene 'Renne' Bartsch, B.Sc. Informatics" <ietf@bartschnet.de>
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Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2018 22:20:22 +0200
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/S6bnji-3uS0jg-0WCj6-EU46ouA>
Subject: [TLS] Make DANE-TLS (RFC 6698) mandatory for TLS
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Hi,

TLS is prone to Man-In-The-Middle attacks with unjustly obtained intermediate certificates (e.g. firewall appliances).
The DNSSEC KSK-rollover worked like a charm.

So I suggest to make DANE-TLS mandatory for TLS to prevent Man-In-The-Middle attacks with unjustly obtained intermediate certificates.

Regards,

Renne

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