Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices
Robert Cragie <robert.cragie@gridmerge.com> Fri, 21 March 2014 15:18 UTC
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Date: Fri, 21 Mar 2014 15:19:03 +0000
From: Robert Cragie <robert.cragie@gridmerge.com>
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To: Rene Struik <rstruik.ext@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices
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Hi Rene, There is certainly a place for device certificates but they are generally quite expensive in terms of the infrastructure needed to support them as Michael points out. There are no specific links I can point to but the use case is using relatively short codes which are put into e.g. a home router through a web interface to provide steering, a basis for authenticating another device onto the network and a secure channel for delivery of configuration/bootstrapping information. WPS PIN is an example of this (notwithstanding its implementational flaws). Using TLS/DTLS as a basis provides the possibility of reuse at the application layer, which is a bonus for the relatively constrained devices generally considered to be in use in the IoT. Robert On 21/03/2014 12:26 PM, Michael Sweet wrote: > Rene, > > Installing device certificates during manufacturing is not a simple > process - the factory would need to act as a CA or would need to have > a supply of certificates that matches whatever identifiers are used by > the devices. Not to mention how you'd manage revocation if the root > was compromised... > > > On Mar 20, 2014, at 9:52 PM, Rene Struik <rstruik.ext@gmail.com > <mailto:rstruik.ext@gmail.com>> wrote: > >> Hi Robert: >> >> Wouldn't it be much easier to embed device certificates with >> constrained devices at manufacturing? This may do away with need to >> store info that is not public on servers. >> >> If you could provide some links to discussions in "IoT community >> groups" interested in this, that would help. >> >> Best regards, Rene >> >> == >> There is a lot of interest in the IoT community in using some form of >> PAKE in conjunction with DTLS (or TLS with EAP) for authenticating >> commissioning/bootstrapping of IoT devices onto IoT networks >> >> On 3/20/2014 1:21 PM, Robert Cragie wrote: >>> >>> It should be remembered that TLS is used in places other than web >>> browsers - the existence of the DICE WG is testament to this. There >>> is a lot of interest in the IoT community in using some form of PAKE >>> in conjunction with DTLS (or TLS with EAP) for authenticating >>> commissioning/bootstrapping of IoT devices onto IoT networks. I >>> realise this is different to the original proposition in this thread >>> but wanted to draw this to the attention of the WG nevertheless. >>> >>> Robert >>> >>> On 20 Mar 2014 12:28, "Daniel Kahn Gillmor" <dkg@fifthhorseman.net >>> <mailto:dkg@fifthhorseman.net>> wrote: >>> >>> On 03/20/2014 12:18 PM, Paul Hoffman wrote: >>> > As an important note, you did not define "we" above. A few >>> possible expansions would be: >>> > >>> > - The TLS WG, where this thread currently lives, does not get >>> to define Web UI without a charter change. >>> > >>> > - The HTTPbis WG has not asked the TLS WG to take over this >>> work, nor has it embraced anything like it. >>> > >>> > - The IETF doesn't do this kind of work as a whole body. >>> > >>> > - The IAB (of which none of us are part of the "we") might >>> take the topic on and suggest ways which the IETF might do the work. >>> >>> yep, thanks for the clarification. I actually meant "we" in the >>> broad >>> sense of "the community of people who care about making >>> communications >>> on the web more secure", which includes groups you didn't even >>> mention >>> above, like web site designers, systems administrators, etc. >>> >>> It's still on-topic here (despite the broad scope implied above) >>> because >>> the TLS WG does have a role to play, by considering the merits of >>> proposals like http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-tls-care, as >>> well as considering alternatives that deal with this particular >>> use case. >>> >>> >> option (A) is seriously hard, maybe impossible given the >>> state of the >>> >> web. option (B) is terrible. >>> > >>> > Exactly right, for any value of "we". >>> >>> :( >>> >>> --dkg >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> TLS mailing list >>> TLS@ietf.org <mailto:TLS@ietf.org> >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> TLS mailing list >>> TLS@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >> >> >> -- >> email:rstruik.ext@gmail.com | Skype: rstruik >> cell: +1 (647) 867-5658 | US: +1 (415) 690-7363 >> _______________________________________________ >> TLS mailing list >> TLS@ietf.org <mailto:TLS@ietf.org> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > > _________________________________________________________ > Michael Sweet, Senior Printing System Engineer, PWG Chair >
- [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by def… Andy Lutomirski
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Andy Lutomirski
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Ryan Sleevi
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Andy Lutomirski
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Andy Lutomirski
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Ryan Sleevi
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Ryan Sleevi
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Peter Sylvester
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Andy Lutomirski
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Andy Lutomirski
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Paul Hoffman
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Robert Cragie
- [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices (was: … Rene Struik
- Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices (w… Michael Sweet
- Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices (w… t.petch
- Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices (w… Michael Sweet
- Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices Anders Rundgren
- Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices (w… Max Pritikin (pritikin)
- Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices (w… Don Sturek
- Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices Robert Cragie
- Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices Paterson, Kenny
- Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices Feng Hao
- Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices Paterson, Kenny
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Yaron Sheffer
- Re: [TLS] Should TLS 1.3 use an augmented PAKE by… Yaron Sheffer
- Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices Feng Hao
- Re: [TLS] bootstrapping of constrained devices Dan Harkins