Re: [TLS] Verifying X.509 Certificate Chains out of order

"Ben Laurie" <benl@google.com> Sun, 12 October 2008 20:28 UTC

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Date: Sun, 12 Oct 2008 21:28:41 +0100
From: "Ben Laurie" <benl@google.com>
To: "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@cs.columbia.edu>
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Cc: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>, tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Verifying X.509 Certificate Chains out of order
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On Mon, Oct 6, 2008 at 4:33 PM, Steven M. Bellovin <smb@cs.columbia.edu>; wrote:
> On Mon, 06 Oct 2008 07:41:52 -0700
> Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>; wrote:
>
>> I think there are two separate issues here:
>>
>> (1) Whether implementations should be required to send certificates
>>     in a specific order.
>> (2) Whether implementations should generate an error if they are
>>     received in another order.
>>
> "Be conservative in what you send; be liberal in what you accept."

I thought we'd given up on that as a useful generalisation since it
introduces security problems in some circumstances, for example HTTP
header stuffing. Which is not to say I am opposed to this particular
change, but that adage is an entirely insufficient justification.
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