Re: [TLS] Encrypted SNI

Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietftls@sleevi.com> Fri, 02 June 2017 12:03 UTC

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From: Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietftls@sleevi.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Jun 2017 08:03:40 -0400
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To: Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>, "ops-dir@ietf.org" <ops-dir@ietf.org>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>, Benoit Claise <bclaise@cisco.com>, "sec-ads@ietf.org" <sec-ads@ietf.org>, "ops-ads@ietf.org" <ops-ads@ietf.org>, ops-chairs@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Encrypted SNI
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On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 6:31 AM, Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de> wrote:

> On Fri, Jun 02, 2017 at 01:16:01PM +0300, Richard Barnes wrote:
> > Operators trying to do this by inspecting TLS (and not decrypting) are
> > going to have a bad time anyway.  With HTTP/2 connection coalescing, even
> > if they can see the certificate, the actual HTTP request could be for any
> > name in the certificate.  So there's nothing really gained by exposing
> the
> > certificate.
>
> If a web service hoster does not provide any useful demultiplexer then it
> can of course not
> expect not to get blacklisted across services. Is it not already common
> practice to assign
> separate certificates to separate "web customers" ?
>

No. It's typically the opposite.