Re: [TLS] [Fwd: WWW-Authenticate challenge for client-certificates]
Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com> Thu, 21 January 2010 16:58 UTC
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Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2010 16:58:44 +0000
From: Joe Orton <jorton@redhat.com>
To: Bruno Harbulot <Bruno.Harbulot@manchester.ac.uk>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [Fwd: WWW-Authenticate challenge for client-certificates]
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On Tue, Jan 19, 2010 at 02:40:54PM +0000, Bruno Harbulot wrote: ... > This leads to a couple of problems: > - The HTTP application is unable to inform the client it would rather > have another certificate than the one that is presented. Whether-or-not > to accept the certificate is done by the trust management mechanism of > the TLS layer, and it is difficult for the HTTP application to deal > with. Often, once the certificate has been negotiated, browsers usually > keep the TLS connection open and changing certificate can often only be > done by closing the browser or letting the connection time out. > - If a certificate is mandatory, the 'require' mode leads to a handshake > error code on the client side, resulting in an abrupt error message, > which is confusing for most users. I don't see how either of these problems are a consequence of protocol design, merely server implementation or configuration. It is simple to configure mod_ssl to avoid the second problem - you make client certificates requested but optional ("SSLVerifyClient optional"), and then use an HTTP authorization-level check to present an HTTP 403 error if in fact the TLS layer did not receive a client cert (using "SSLRequire"). The 403 error page can be customized as usual. You could do something similar for the first problem though the configuration might be a little awkward. Regards, Joe
- [TLS] [Fwd: WWW-Authenticate challenge for client… Bruno Harbulot
- Re: [TLS] [Fwd: WWW-Authenticate challenge for cl… Nicolas Williams
- Re: [TLS] [Fwd: WWW-Authenticate challenge for cl… Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] [Fwd: WWW-Authenticate challenge for cl… Bruno Harbulot
- Re: [TLS] WWW-Authenticate challenge for client-c… Bruno Harbulot
- Re: [TLS] WWW-Authenticate challenge for client-c… Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] [Fwd: WWW-Authenticate challenge for cl… Joe Orton
- Re: [TLS] [Fwd: WWW-Authenticate challenge for cl… Bruno Harbulot
- Re: [TLS] [Fwd: WWW-Authenticate challenge for cl… Joe Orton
- Re: [TLS] [Fwd: WWW-Authenticate challenge for cl… Bruno Harbulot