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[TLS] Collisions (Re: Consensus Call: FNV vs SHA1)

Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@oracle.com> Mon, 10 May 2010 21:32 UTC

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Date: Mon, 10 May 2010 16:30:36 -0500
From: Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@oracle.com>
To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
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Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: [TLS] Collisions (Re: Consensus Call: FNV vs SHA1)
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On Mon, May 10, 2010 at 02:10:35PM -0700, Paul Hoffman wrote:
> Again, +1 to what Nico says here. If we're trying to make using FNV
> sensible for future use as well, let's do the work to get it right
> here.

Thanks.  Note that I don't see FNV as having a bright future in our
protocols, so that I'm not concerned about making it easier to use in
the future.

I'm, however, concerned that the design of this protocol won't handle
collisions very well, whether FNV or SHA-1.  At first glance it sure
looks that way.  And ISTM that there's a better design that is or can be
impervious to hash collisions.  I could review the document thouroughly
and convince myself one way or the other, but I'm lazy -- I'd rather
hear from the authors, then evaluate their explanations.

Nico
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