[TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSLKEYLOGFILE Formatfor TLS
Arnaud Taddei <arnaud.taddei@broadcom.com> Tue, 25 February 2025 09:22 UTC
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From: Arnaud Taddei <arnaud.taddei@broadcom.com>
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2025 10:22:40 +0100
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To: Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>
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CC: Aaron Zauner <azet=40azet.org@dmarc.ietf.org>, "Bellebaum, Thomas" <thomas.bellebaum@aisec.fraunhofer.de>, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSLKEYLOGFILE Formatfor TLS
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+1 Arnaud Taddei Global Security Strategist | Enterprise Security Group | ITU-T SG17 chair mobile: +41 79 506 1129 Geneva, Switzerland arnaud.taddei@broadcom.com | broadcom.com On Mon, Feb 24, 2025 at 10:55 PM Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net> wrote: > On Tue, Feb 25, 2025, at 06:56, Aaron Zauner wrote: > > To be clear; I agree with that in principle but have the feeling that > > the discussion around an applicable threat model misses the issue of > > what should be in IETF and what should be in development docs, > > debugging tools etc entirely. I'm not currently working on maintaining > > a crypto lib as many of you are but you can't honestly tell me it's not > > possible to work on your end without IETF guidance on debug specifics > > that allow encrypted traffic detail export -- which you already have in > > place for debug and dev anyway. > > This also misses the point. The existence of this format (it will exist > whether the IETF publishes a document or not) has enabled interoperation > between a number of tools. The point of moving this work to the IETF was > to transfer governance from what was ad hoc to something recognized and > respected by the community of people who build the interoperating tools. > > Some people view interoperable standards as somehow changing the demand > and availability of the thing they document. Maybe that's true in some > markets, but my experience is that the demand is what causes the creation > of standards, not the other way around. Also, if there were not already > interoperation and you were concerned that interoperation would cause > problems, this might be problematic, but this is a case where that > interoperation already exists. > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org > To unsubscribe send an email to tls-leave@ietf.org > -- This electronic communication and the information and any files transmitted with it, or attached to it, are confidential and are intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom it is addressed and may contain information that is confidential, legally privileged, protected by privacy laws, or otherwise restricted from disclosure to anyone else. If you are not the intended recipient or the person responsible for delivering the e-mail to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, copying, distributing, dissemination, forwarding, printing, or copying of this e-mail is strictly prohibited. If you received this e-mail in error, please return the e-mail to the sender, delete it from your computer, and destroy any printed copy of it.
- [TLS] 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSLKEYL… Sean Turner
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Salz, Rich
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… David Benjamin
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Salz, Rich
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… David Benjamin
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… David Benjamin
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Salz, Rich
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Sean Turner
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Salz, Rich
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… David Benjamin
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Stephen Farrell
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Bellebaum, Thomas
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Ben Smyth
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Bellebaum, Thomas
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Stephen Farrell
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Salz, Rich
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Bellebaum, Thomas
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Ben Smyth
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Bellebaum, Thomas
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Andrei Popov
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… _ _
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Martin Thomson
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Stephen Farrell
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… David Adrian
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Alicja Kario
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Muhammad Usama Sardar
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Aaron Zauner (azet)
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Arnaud Taddei
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Achim Kraus
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… S Moonesamy
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Alicja Kario
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Alicja Kario
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Aaron Zauner
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Arnaud Taddei
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Stephen Farrell
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Arnaud Taddei
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Ben Smyth
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Sean Turner
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Christian Huitema
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Bellebaum, Thomas
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Aaron Zauner
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Martin Thomson
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Aaron Zauner
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Arnaud Taddei
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: 2nd Working Group Last C… Yaakov Stein
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: 2nd Working Group Last C… Andrei Popov
- [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] 2nd Working Group Last Call … Alicja Kario
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Salz, Rich
- [TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSL… Ilari Liusvaara