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Re: [TLS] Adoption call for draft-davidben-tls13-pkcs1

Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> Thu, 12 December 2019 16:26 UTC

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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Date: Thu, 12 Dec 2019 17:26:35 +0100
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Adoption call for draft-davidben-tls13-pkcs1
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On Thursday, 12 December 2019 16:50:45 CET, David Benjamin wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 12, 2019 at 6:51 AM Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:
>
>> On Wednesday, 11 December 2019 18:06:19 CET, David Benjamin wrote: ...
>
> ... some TLS stacks don't
> support renegotiation as a server at all (BoringSSL and Go).
> 
> ... Chrome does not accept it ...

so because Google decided one thing, everybody has to bow down to it?

and, sorry, but I consider the privacy angle a red herring, nobody is doing
proper AppData padding, so the connections leak privacy information in TLS 
1.3
like a sieve too

>> An endpoint MAY use renegotiation to provide confidentiality protection
>> for client credentials offered in the handshake
>
> An HTTP/2 client speaks as soon as the handshake completes and does not know
> whether the server is going to do this.

if privacy was so important why nobody worked on it with HTTP/2? It's not 
like
much has changed in the last 4 years on that front.

sorry, I'm not buying that argument
-- 
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic

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