[TLS] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC8446 (5874)
RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> Sat, 12 October 2019 04:22 UTC
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Subject: [TLS] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC8446 (5874)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8446, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3". -------------------------------------- You may review the report below and at: https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5874 -------------------------------------- Type: Technical Reported by: Mr Laurie Perrin <lperrin@bellaliant.net> Section: 5.1 Original Text ------------- ... Application Data messages contain data that is opaque to TLS. Application Data messages are always protected. Zero-length fragments of Application Data MAY be sent, as they are potentially useful as a traffic analysis countermeasure. Application Data fragments MAY be split across multiple records or coalesced into a single record. Corrected Text -------------- ... Application Data messages contain data that is opaque to TLS. Application Data messages are always protected. Zero-length fragments of Application Data (i.e. those encapsulating an TLSInnerPlaintext record having a content field of length zero) MAY be sent, as they are potentially useful as a traffic analysis countermeasure. Application Data fragments MAY be split across multiple records or coalesced into a single record. Notes ----- In the interest of clarity, it may be prudent to specify the type of record for which a fragment of length zero is being considered - it cannot be that of the TLSCiphertext itself, for "Application Data messages are always protected," therefore I infer this relates to the TLSInnerPlaintext content field (of length "TLSPlaintext.length") - i.e. to the TLSPlaintext fragment. Note: This comment also applies to previous versions of the TLS specification, in particular with the introduction of the respective text concerning zero-length fragments in RFC 5246. In TLS 1.2, this would be the GenericXXCipher content field of length "TLSCompressed.length" - i.e. to the TLSCompressed fragment. Note: The implications of zero-length records must be considered with respect to potential vectors for denial of service. Instructions: ------------- This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. -------------------------------------- RFC8446 (draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28) -------------------------------------- Title : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 Publication Date : August 2018 Author(s) : E. Rescorla Category : PROPOSED STANDARD Source : Transport Layer Security Area : Security Stream : IETF Verifying Party : IESG
- [TLS] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC8446 (5874) RFC Errata System
- Re: [TLS] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC8446 (58… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC8446 (58… Andrei Popov
- Re: [TLS] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC8446 (58… Benjamin Kaduk