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Re: [TLS] Questions about some expired drafts

Aaron Zauner <azet@azet.org> Tue, 27 January 2015 20:32 UTC

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Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2015 21:32:51 +0100
From: Aaron Zauner <azet@azet.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Questions about some expired drafts
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Hi *,

Salz, Rich wrote:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00
> 
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-rescorla-tls-extended-random-02
> 
> OpenSSL includes at least the opaque-prf one.  Any reason to keep the
> code?  (I’m ripping out all sorts of old stuff now)
> 
I see no value in keeping either of both drafts implemented.

* draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00:
Section 4. pretty much states what any reader of the document will
conclude; implementing this document will probably cause more (fatal)
implementation errors rather than adding anything useful to TLS.
Furthermore it adds unnecessary complexity on both ends.

* draft-rescorla-tls-extended-random-02:
Same as above.


Also: BULLRUN/EDGEHILL explicitly mention subversion of standards by not
only the NSA but specifically one of the authors subdivisions. Don't
want to start tinfoil-hattery here but these IDs are rather useless, and
to be honest if US Gov. really /needs/ to use these extensions they
could go ahead and use them anyway without being a standard as they do
with other crypto primitives.

Aaron

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