Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 ECC Private Key Compromise? (was Re: Un-deprecating everything TLS 1.2)

Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com> Wed, 07 October 2020 02:25 UTC

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To: Nick Harper <nharper@google.com>
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From: Michael D'Errico <mike-list@pobox.com>
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Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2020 22:25:33 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 ECC Private Key Compromise? (was Re: Un-deprecating everything TLS 1.2)
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On 10/6/20 19:11, Nick Harper wrote:
> I conclude that if this leads to some vulnerability, this implies the 
> ECDHE algorithm (or its implementation), not the TLS handshake, is flawed.

Thank you for the analysis!

Mike