Re: [TLS] SCSV vs RI when both specified. Was: Updated draft

Dr Stephen Henson <lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk> Mon, 21 December 2009 17:37 UTC

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Date: Mon, 21 Dec 2009 17:37:41 +0000
From: Dr Stephen Henson <lists@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] SCSV vs RI when both specified. Was: Updated draft
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Michael D'Errico wrote:
> So what's the consensus on this?
> 
>   1) client MUST not send both signals, and a server MUST abort
>      if it sees both
> 
> or
> 
>   2) client MAY send both signals, and the server MUST ignore
>      SCSV when RI is present
> 
> I prefer (2) since there is no security problem with the client sending
> both -- the only problem is the current wording in the spec.  Remember
> the spec is currently a DRAFT, and that means it is open to changes!  I
> don't understand the reluctance to clarify this.
> 

I'd have a minor preference for #2 but I'd also vote for option #3

3) Couldn't give a toss just get the fecking spec finalised, OK?

;-)

Steve.
-- 
Dr Stephen N. Henson.
Core developer of the   OpenSSL project: http://www.openssl.org/
Freelance consultant see: http://www.drh-consultancy.co.uk/
Email: shenson@drh-consultancy.co.uk, PGP key: via homepage.