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Re: [TLS] About encrypting SNI

James Cloos <cloos@jhcloos.com> Wed, 16 April 2014 18:44 UTC

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From: James Cloos <cloos@jhcloos.com>
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In-Reply-To: <CALCETrUch98b+4qxzkWiy6Hsyg5VBsks9DHv2J1jX08LC48tnQ@mail.gmail.com> (Andy Lutomirski's message of "Wed, 16 Apr 2014 10:22:08 -0700")
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Date: Wed, 16 Apr 2014 14:32:13 -0400
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Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Subject: Re: [TLS] About encrypting SNI
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>>>>> "AL" == Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> writes:

AL> US-governement-preferred choice: ECIES/Elligator Squared on P-256,
AL> with AES-128-GCM.

DJB's parallel paper (http://cr.yp.to/snuffle/bruteforce-20050425.pdf)
implies all should s/AES-128/AES-256/g.  Especialy when there is a
significant quantity of traffic available for probabilistic attacks.

(I presume those who like NIST crypto will be happy with AES256-GCM-SHA384.)

-JimC
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James Cloos <cloos@jhcloos.com>         OpenPGP: 1024D/ED7DAEA6

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