Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Mon, 26 September 2016 23:09 UTC
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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> On Sep 26, 2016, at 3:23 PM, BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org> wrote: > > That said, at least one of the sites you mentioned was known to have an APT inside their perimeter (Operation Aurora) for about a month and part of the tactics within that attack which was publicly reported was the use of "SSL" to mask C&C communications. That's the type of threat we are concerned about inside of the enterprise network and we need visibility (and flexibility appropriate to our network design and risk tolerance) to solve for these issues in way that protects people like the ones you mentioned. I very much doubt that the APT C&C traffic went out of its way to use RSA key exchange to make the traffic enterprise-friendly, or even if it happened to use RSA key exchange that the private keys were available to the victim site... All that RSA key exchange gives you is the ability to use long-term keys of servers you control to decrypt past traffic through that server if the private keys are still (or for better or worse become) available. There are other ways to accomplish this. For example, the server might use session ticket keys that are stored centrally encrypted under a suitable escrow key. If clients always enable session tickets, then every handshake will result in the server returning a session ticket, in which case the session can be later decrypted if the session ticket keys are available. There's no need to change to the TLS protocol to make such things possible, it is sufficient to purchase server devices that in one way or another record session master secrets for later recovery. There will surely be vendors who'll be more than happy to be paid to fulfill any business needs in this space. Having worked in IT security in the financial services industry for more than a couple of decades now, I am rather surprised and somewhat appalled by this thread. I don't believe that the concerns raised should in any way influence protocol design. Products that offer less forward-secrecy than the protocol would otherwise deliver will be available to those who control either or both end-points and need to be able to be able to produce after-the-fact plaintext. The good news about doing key escrow deliberately, rather than as an unintended side-effect of RSA key exchange, is that it can be both more reliable and more secure, since the escrow private keys need not be the same as the server long-term authentication keys, and are therefor less vulnerable. RSA key exchange has a long history of problems, and it is time to move on. We should not be overly attached to one particular way of doing key escrow. -- -- Viktor.
- [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 BITS Security
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Yuhong Bao
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Paterson, Kenny
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Kyle Rose
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 BITS Security
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Yuhong Bao
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Andrei Popov
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Xiaoyin Liu
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Hugo Krawczyk
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Colm MacCárthaigh
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Hugo Krawczyk
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Ryan Carboni
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Colm MacCárthaigh
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Geoffrey Keating
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Thijs van Dijk
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Stephen Farrell
- [TLS] debugging tools [was: Industry Concerns abo… Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] debugging tools [was: Industry Concerns… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [TLS] debugging tools [was: Industry Concerns… Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 nalini.elkins
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Ackermann, Michael
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Jeffrey Walton
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Dan Brown
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Ackermann, Michael
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Ackermann, Michael
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 nalini.elkins
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 BITS Security
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Jeffrey Walton
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Yaron Sheffer
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Tony Arcieri
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 BITS Security
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Xiaoyin Liu
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 BITS Security
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Stephen Farrell
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 BITS Security
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 BITS Security
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Jeffrey Walton
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Adam Caudill
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Peter Bowen
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Bill Frantz
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Pawel Jakub Dawidek
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Ackermann, Michael
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Brian Sniffen
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Ackermann, Michael
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Hovav Shacham
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Pascal Urien
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 BITS Security
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 BITS Security
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 BITS Security
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Xiaoyin Liu
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Andrei Popov
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Geoffrey Keating
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Judson Wilson
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 BITS Security
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 BITS Security
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Seth David Schoen
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 BITS Security
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Michał Staruch
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Tony Arcieri
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Ronald del Rosario
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Seth David Schoen
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Stephen Farrell
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Joachim Strömbergson
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Dan Brown
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Jeffrey Walton
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Dan Brown
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Bill Frantz
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Melinda Shore
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Tony Arcieri
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Melinda Shore
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Tony Arcieri
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Bill Frantz
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Ryan Carboni
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 BITS Security
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 BITS Security
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Jeffrey Walton
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Tony Arcieri
- Re: [TLS] debugging tools [was: Industry Concerns… Florian Weimer
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Florian Weimer
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 BITS Security
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Sean Turner
- Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 Ryan Carboni