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Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA should die

Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> Tue, 14 April 2015 03:02 UTC

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From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA should die
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On Mon 2015-04-13 20:36:58 -0400, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> So a key question is whether policies that rule out various corners
> of the product space are legitimately required???

Here's one (granted, contrived) policy:

 * i'm willing to talk to US Government peers (they all want Suite B)
   and Russian Government peers (they all want GOST).  so my policy is
   that I want either an all-GOST collection or an all-suite-B
   collection.  a la carte would suggest that i'd be OK with GOST key
   agreement combined with suite B symmetric crypto, though i would not
   consider that OK.

     --dkg

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