[TLS] Éric Vyncke's No Objection on draft-ietf-tls-sni-encryption-05: (with COMMENT)

Éric Vyncke via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Tue, 17 September 2019 20:58 UTC

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Éric Vyncke has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-tls-sni-encryption-05: No Objection

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COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Thank you for the work put into this document. It is well-written and easy to
follow. Please find below a couple of comments and nits.

Reading
"  In practice, it may well be that no solution can meet every
   requirement, and that practical solutions will have to make some
   compromises."
in the abstract brought a smile on my face ;-) Same for "employees of the UK
National Cyber Security Centre" at the end ;-)

Regards,

-éric

== COMMENTS ==

-- Section 2.1 --
C.1) I would suggest to use the words "network operators" rather than ISP as
enterprise or parents for home networks are also relying on clear-text SNI to
enforce some policies.

-- Section 2.2 --
C.2) The word "abuses" seems a little strong in the first paragraph, I prefer
the wording used in 2.1 "unanticipated usage". But, this is only one comment.

-- Section 3.6 --
C.3) It is rather a question for my own curiosity... "The fronting service
could be pressured by adversaries. " is an obvious attack but even if SNI is
protected, the fronting service can still apply any policy to a protected
service as it has the knowledge of protected services by design. Hence, I
wonder why this case is mentioned here.

-- Security section --
Like Warren, I find the content of this section unusual.

== NITS ==

-- Section 2.1 --
Probably worth expanding "MITM" at first use.

--Section 3.3 --
Probably worth expanding "DOS" at first use.