[TLS] Re: 2nd Working Group Last Call for The SSLKEYLOGFILE Format for TLS

[_ _ <[e-mail]>]

Hey,

I disagree with this because if an attacker could write to the environment
variable used by the program or is able to side-load a library and capture
outbound packets, it is very likely that they already have privileged
access to the machine.

However, I acknowledge that allowing an attacker to easily access these
functions is not desirable.

In this specific case, environment variables are secure enough.

Romain


Le jeu. 20 févr. 2025, 10:15, Bellebaum, Thomas <
[e-mail]> a écrit :

> Hello,
>
> I have just become aware of this draft and I believe there might be a good
> cautionary addition I would like to propose:
>
> Specifically, I am worried that with further encouragement to standardize
> this format, it will become a convenient way to surveil unsuspecting end
> users. All this requires is "some" access to the system, for many
> implementations this includes setting an environment variable. What an
> attacker gains is then something more reliable, machine-readable (and in
> many cases useful) than a simple keylogger.
>
> The problem here (in my opinion) is the word "unsuspecting". I would like
> to see an addition to the draft along the following lines:
>
> > A TLS application interacting with an end-user (e.g. a browser) MUST
> clearly communicate any requests to log TLS secrets to the user and MUST
> NOT indicate a secure connection.
>
> Otherwise, this draft looks fine to me.
> Thanks for your efforts,
>
> Thomas
>
> --
>
> ```
> M.Sc. Thomas Bellebaum
> Applied Privacy Technologies
> Fraunhofer Institute for Applied and Integrated Security AISEC
>
> Lichtenbergstraße 11, 85748 Garching near Munich (Germany)
> Tel. [phone]
> [e-mail]
> https://www.aisec.fraunhofer.de
>
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