Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com> Wed, 14 March 2018 19:56 UTC

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From: Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 12:55:58 -0700
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To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Cc: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>, IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted
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On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 3:16 PM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>; wrote:
> Second, using
> TLS1.2 does not technically address the issue.  If the client were to
> exclusively offer DHE-based ciphersuites, then the visibility techniques
> that have been used in the past are thwarted.

I expect this configuration to become more common in the future.  In
November 2017, US NIST published draft SP 800-52 r2
(https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-52/rev-2/draft )
which explicitly disallows all non-DH cipher suites.  The comment
period closed on 1 Feb 2018, and none of the published comments pushed
back on this.  Given that PCI DSS and many other standards refer to
the NIST Special Publications for implementation requirements, I would
not be surprised to see DH-only (including ECDH/ECDHE/DHE) become
prevalent.

Based on the comments from the proponents of the various drafts, it
would seem that this should be a bigger concern than any changes in
TLS 1.3, as it is implementable today.  I highly suspect that the
currently deployed systems will not handle handshakes that only offer
DH suites, right?

Thanks,
Peter