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Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 - Support for compression to be removed

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Tue, 22 September 2015 17:35 UTC

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To: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>, "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Cc: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 - Support for compression to be removed
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On 22/09/15 17:23, Tony Arcieri wrote:
> But an unsafe feature shouldn't be kept in
> TLS just because some protocols want to do unsafe things and are too lazy
> to implement their own compression.

Compression does have issues clearly, but it's not correct to describe
people wanting TLS to compress as lazy. They're rather looking for the
same features that TLS has offered for a couple of decades. So if there
were a way to help them, that'd be good. And if not, the onus I think
is on us in this WG to clearly explain why we're removing that feature
in TLS1.3.

That doesn't have to be text in the TLS1.3 specification but I would
guess the question may keep coming up, so documenting the answer in
some archival form (such as an RFC:-) might be a good plan.

S.

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