Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on MTI Algorithms

Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com> Thu, 02 April 2015 20:12 UTC

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From: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
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Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2015 16:12:35 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on MTI Algorithms
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On Thursday, April 02, 2015 03:44:18 pm Nico Williams wrote:
> The answers don't really matter.  Suppose that you are implementing such
> a library, you don't implement the required algorithms, and that you
> call the result something like YoavTLS, or FooLangTLS ("TLS for the Foo
> programming language").  Will the IETF police drag you to the IETF jail
> for doing that?  No.

Fortunately for you, the IETF police are only armed with water balloons made out of an over-engineered rubber that doesn't break on impact, and whilst the IETF jail was agreed to be on an island in the middle of nowhere that nobody can really get to, it has never been constructed because they've been arguing over the color to paint the roof for the past 30 years. :p

Serious answer: Just write a separate IoT TLS spec that just contains modifications for whatever isn't viable because you're creating a system not designed to necessarily interoperate with the general Internet. General TLS implementations could implement it as well, or not, depending on needs.


Dave