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Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-03.txt

Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> Mon, 15 December 2014 21:46 UTC

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Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 16:46:48 -0500
From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-03.txt
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On 12/15/2014 04:41 PM, mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex) wrote:
> The scenario where this problem can hit is with non-malicious
> middleboxes that do not recognize (and therefore do not permit)
> TLSv1.2 handshakes.

How do we distinguish between these non-malicious middleboxes that do
not permit TLSv1.2 because they don't recognize it and malicious
middleboxes that want to force modern peers into a downgrade by not
permitting TLSv1.2?

Do the non-malicious middleboxes use RFC 3514?

	--dkg

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