Re: [TLS] Four concerns (was Re: draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at IETF101)

Hot Middlebox <hot.middlebox@gmail.com> Wed, 14 March 2018 22:08 UTC

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From: Hot Middlebox <hot.middlebox@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 18:08:44 -0400
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To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
Cc: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, IETF TLS <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Four concerns (was Re: draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility at IETF101)
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The requirements for visibility exist in an array of regulated environments
worldwide.  It is one of the presentation areas in the Hot Middlebox
Workshop.
http://www.etsi.org/etsi-security-week-2018/middlebox-security?tab=1

The Middlebox Hackathon site is also now public so everyone can
experience how a browser plug-in client (to be provided) can be used in
conjunction with a fine grained Middlebox Security Protocol for Middlebox
discovery and controlled visibility by an end-user in a way that meets both
user and regulatory interests.  The draft specification will be published
in two weeks.

--the Hot Middlebox organizers

On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 9:42 AM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com>; wrote:

>
> >    So aside from enabling MitM, this also enables session resumption by
>     the decryption service, something that the security considerations
>     neglects to include in its list.
>
> So I think this is an important point.  I assume the authors did not
> realize this. That shows how hard, and risky, it is to get this right.  In
> the US, we have been having arguments where the national police force (FBI)
> is insisting that tech companies can create a "golden key" that only they
> can use, and the security people are saying it is impossible.  This seems
> like another instance, no?
>
> Oh heck, let me ask the uncomfortable question:  Russ, did you know this
> or was Martin's point new to you?
>
>         /r$
>
>
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