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Re: [TLS] Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-tls-sslv3-diediedie-00

Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com> Tue, 27 January 2015 23:15 UTC

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From: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
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Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2015 18:15:22 -0500
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-tls-sslv3-diediedie-00
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On Tuesday, January 27, 2015 03:44:36 pm Martin Thomson wrote:
> On 27 January 2015 at 12:11, Aaron Zauner <azet@azet.org> wrote:
> > TLS 1.0 is only marginally different from SSLv3. I think a similar
> > document should exist for TLS 1.0. Yes I'm aware of the implications on
> > clients/servers.
> 
> I think that TLS 1.0 is nearing that point too.  But I'm not that
> enthusiastic about being the hitman there.  Well, not yet.

Is it at all practical to publish an TLS RFC stating intent to deprecate
TLS 1.0/1.1 within some fixed timeframe? I think everyone would rather
phase it out then have to "be the hitman" each time.

A straw man proposal would be something like:

1) TLS 1.0 & 1.1 SHOULD NOT be supported by servers, effective immediately.
2) TLS 1.0 & 1.1 MUST NOT be supported by servers after X months.
3) TLS 1.0 & 1.1 SHOULD NOT be supported by clients after Y months.

I know the UTA BCP I-D deals with this area too, but a specific RFC from the
TLS WG might have more impact at reducing numbers before the inevitable
catastrophic vulnerability that warrants a diediedie RFC.


Dave

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