Subject: [TLS] Re: Working Group Last Call for Use of ML-DSA in TLS 1.3
From: Jacob Appelbaum <[email-masked]>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz=[email-masked]>, Muhammad Usama Sardar <[email-masked]>, Ilari Liusvaara <[email-masked]>
Cc: TLS List <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 4 May 2026 15:25:21 +0200
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>

Hi Rich,

On 5/4/26 15:00, Salz, Rich wrote:
> * I had sincerely proposed what I believe is a good middle ground to
> move on. WG is free to trash my proposal.
> 
> Okay then.  Your proposal is not a middle ground.

What are the sides from your perspective and what would be a middle 
ground if not this?

 > It says that hybrids are better.

When better is defined as "two hard problems are more secure than one 
maybe hard problem" or "one new failure cannot result in a practical 
break of the protocol" then it follows that hybrids are better.

If we're not talking about "better" in the context of security but byte 
overhead or energy efficiency, then we'd need some other definitions for 
the word better, I suppose.

> 
> I still maintain that a document that defines A is not the place for
> an A compared-to B comparison.

Where should it go if not there?

If it should go somewhere else, would a reference to that other place 
also be wrong?

> From the mailing list traffic, several other long-timers agree with that.
> 
This reads as an appeal to authority over a reasonable analysis that is 
related to Usama's formal proof. I do not find it compelling and it 
appears as dismissive to Usama's efforts. What's the constructive 
counter proposal other than writing as if hybrids don't exist or that 
PQC without a hybrid construction isn't a novel risk?

Long-timers can be wrong and given the Dual_EC history and various 
related drafts, they might even be wrong twice for the concerns raised 
by Usama and others.

Kind regards,
Jacob Appelbaum