Re: [TLS] Another IRINA bug in TLS

Aaron Zauner <azet@azet.org> Thu, 21 May 2015 13:56 UTC

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Date: Thu, 21 May 2015 15:56:27 +0200
From: Aaron Zauner <azet@azet.org>
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To: Santiago Zanella-Beguelin <santiago@microsoft.com>
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Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Another IRINA bug in TLS
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Santiago Zanella-Beguelin wrote:
> Non-safe primes can be generated using OpenSSL dhparam with the -dsaparam flag, e.g. openssl dhparam -dsaparam 2048
> 
> They are still very common. In a recent full IPv4 scan on port 443, we found 1.7M hosts using non-safe primes against 8.42M using safe primes.
> 
> By far, the most common non-safe prime appears to come from hosts using Amazon EC2; around 321K hosts authenticating with browser-trusted certificates use it.
> 

I'm not sure these are all due to people using openssl(1) with the
"-dsaparam" option, that's a huge number. My question was actually if
people are aware that implementations produce these primes per default.

Aaron