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[TLS] 3DES diediedie

Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com> Thu, 25 August 2016 02:08 UTC

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From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Aug 2016 19:08:02 -0700
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Subject: [TLS] 3DES diediedie
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This attack was published today[*]:

https://sweet32.info/

I bring it up because I think the threat model is similar to the threats
that lead to RC4 "diediedie"

https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7465

Should there be a 3DES "diediedie"?

I believe 3DES is MTI for TLS 1.0/1.1(?) but I think it would make sense
for it to be banned from TLS 1.3.

[*] Lest anyone claim the contrary, I am not surprised by this attack, and
have pushed to have 3DES removed from TLS prior to the publication of this
attack, and can probably find a TLS implementer who can back me up on that.

-- 
Tony Arcieri

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