Re: [TLS] editorial error in draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-17

Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> Tue, 24 October 2017 19:04 UTC

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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Tue, 24 Oct 2017 22:04:23 +0300
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Subject: Re: [TLS] editorial error in draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-17
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Thanks, Martin. This is correct.

So there are two ways to fix this:
As Martin suggests, make TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA one of the MTI instead of the current, or
Add 0xC0,0x23 (TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) to the list of ciphersuites.

The first seems more consistent to me.

Chairs: guidance?  Note that the document is in the RFC editor queue so we’ll need AD approval for the change at this late date. 

Thanks

Yoav

> On 24 Oct 2017, at 16:22, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>; wrote:
> 
> I just noticed a strange inconsistency in section 6 of
> draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-17
> 
>    https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-17#section-6
> 
> The last of the "must implement 1 of these 4" list of cipher suites at
> the end of section 6 is not contained in the table at the beginning of
> section 6 above it (instead, it appears in rfc5289 only).
> 
> I believe that the last ciphersuites should be changed (which will
> provide consistence with the second list entry (the TLSv1.2 MTI cipher suite).
> 
> 
> -Martin
> 
> 
>       +-----------------------------------------+----------------+
>       | CipherSuite                             | Identifier     |
>       +-----------------------------------------+----------------+
>       | TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA           | { 0xC0, 0x06 } |
>       | TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA   | { 0xC0, 0x08 } |
>       | TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA    | { 0xC0, 0x09 } |
>       | TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA    | { 0xC0, 0x0A } |
>       | TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | { 0xC0, 0x2B } |
>       | TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | { 0xC0, 0x2C } |
>       |                                         |                |
>       | TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA             | { 0xC0, 0x10 } |
>       | TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA     | { 0xC0, 0x12 } |
>       | TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA      | { 0xC0, 0x13 } |
>       | TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA      | { 0xC0, 0x14 } |
>       | TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256   | { 0xC0, 0x2F } |
>       | TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384   | { 0xC0, 0x30 } |
>       |                                         |                |
>       | TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA             | { 0xC0, 0x15 } |
>       | TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA     | { 0xC0, 0x17 } |
>       | TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA      | { 0xC0, 0x18 } |
>       | TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA      | { 0xC0, 0x19 } |
>       +-----------------------------------------+----------------+
> 
> 
>   Server implementations SHOULD support all of the following cipher
>   suites, and client implementations SHOULD support at least one of
>   them:
> 
>   o  TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
>   o  TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
>   o  TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
> +  o  TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
> -  o  TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
> 
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