[TLS] [Errata Rejected] RFC7366 (4284)

RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> Mon, 30 March 2015 23:06 UTC

To: dottomi@gmail.com, pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz
From: RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>
Message-Id: <20150330230611.0D5E718046C@rfc-editor.org>
Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2015 16:06:11 -0700
Archived-At: <http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/VvxPlyvfdxjluIblEAT97wGK7ks>
Cc: tls@ietf.org, rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org, iesg@ietf.org
Subject: [TLS] [Errata Rejected] RFC7366 (4284)
Precedence: list

The following errata report has been rejected for RFC7366,
"Encrypt-then-MAC for Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=7366&eid=4284

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Status: Rejected
Type: Technical

Reported by: Tomasz Sobczyk <dottomi@gmail.com>
Date Reported: 2015-03-02
Rejected by: Stephen Farrell (IESG)

Section: 3

Original Text
-------------
The overall TLS packet [2] is then:

   struct {
          ContentType type;
          ProtocolVersion version;
          uint16 length;
          GenericBlockCipher fragment;
          opaque MAC;
          } TLSCiphertext;

   The equivalent DTLS packet [4] is then:

   struct {
          ContentType type;
          ProtocolVersion version;
          uint16 epoch;
          uint48 sequence_number;
          uint16 length;
          GenericBlockCipher fragment;
          opaque MAC;
          } TLSCiphertext;

   This is identical to the existing TLS/DTLS layout, with the only
   difference being that the MAC value is moved outside the encrypted
   data.


Corrected Text
--------------
   The overall TLS packet [2] is then:
   
   struct {
          ContentType type;
          ProtocolVersion version;
          uint16 length;
          GenericBlockCipher fragment;
          opaque MAC[SecurityParameters.mac_length];
   } TLSCiphertext;

   The equivalent DTLS packet [4] is then:

   struct {
          ContentType type;
          ProtocolVersion version;
          uint16 epoch;
          uint48 sequence_number;
          uint16 length;
          GenericBlockCipher fragment;
          opaque MAC[SecurityParameters.mac_length];
   } TLSCiphertext;

   This is identical to the existing TLS/DTLS layout, with the only
   differences being that the MAC value is moved outside the encrypted
   data and the definition of TLSCiphertext.length changes to:

   length
      The length (in bytes) of the following TLSCiphertext.fragment
      and TLSCiphertext.MAC.
      The length MUST NOT exceed 2^14 + 2048.


Notes
-----
MAC array length is missing.
Also, the new structure changes the definition of TLSCiphertext.length.
As it currently stands, the length of the MAC is excluded from TLSCiphertext.length.
This is a duplicate of erratum 4212 which is now verified.
 --VERIFIER NOTES-- 
    This is a duplicate of erratum 4212 which is now verified. 

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RFC7366 (draft-ietf-tls-encrypt-then-mac-03)
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Title               : Encrypt-then-MAC for Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
Publication Date    : September 2014
Author(s)           : P. Gutmann
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Transport Layer Security
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG

[TLS] [Errata Rejected] RFC7366 (4284) RFC Errata System
Re: [TLS] [Errata Rejected] RFC7366 (4284) Megan Ferguson
[TLS] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC7366 (4284) RFC Errata System