Re: [TLS] Confirming consensus: TLS1.3->TLS*

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Fri, 02 December 2016 08:27 UTC

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To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Confirming consensus: TLS1.3->TLS*
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On 02/12/16 03:35, David Benjamin wrote:
> In hindsight, renaming SSL 3.1 was a terrible mistake.

IIRC that was sort-of a condition for adoption of the work
in the IETF 20 years ago, when there were two different
protocols already being deployed and the proponents of one
of them said "we'll use that other one (SSL) but you gotta
change the name of the standard or we can't get our <bosses>
to agree to change to all use the same thing."

So changing to TLS was maybe a mistake or maybe not as it
allowed us to end up with one protocol with two names and
not two (or more) protocols.

Cheers,
S.