Re: [TLS] draft-sullivan-tls-post-handshake-auth-00

Nick Sullivan <nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com> Wed, 17 August 2016 21:50 UTC

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From: Nick Sullivan <nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Aug 2016 21:50:32 +0000
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To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-sullivan-tls-post-handshake-auth-00
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Is there any support for either of the following ideas:

1) moving the OCSP and SCT server extensions to inside the Certificate
message
2) removing post-handshake client authentication from TLS 1.3 in favor of
dedicated and more detailed draft



On Sun, Aug 7, 2016 at 11:42 PM Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
wrote:

> On 8 August 2016 at 16:14, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
> wrote:
> > In 2, I would imagine the context is probably usually a sequence
> > number of some kind.
>
> The draft defines some rules for construction of identifiers that
> prevent collisions and the like.
>
> >> Good question.  Errors in encoding or otherwise problems following the
> >> rules in the spec should result in a connection-level fatal error.
> >> But if the certificate isn't trusted, handling that will be up to the
> >> application.
> >
> > And that should presumably be communicated somehow...
>
> Of course.  See
> https://github.com/grittygrease/tls13-post-handshake-auth/issues/18
> (feel free to contribute)
>
> > Being able for application to to wait for certificate/cv/finised
> > message to be sent, so it can do something special in application
> > layer immediately after that.
>
> Sure.  The usual async API guarantees apply here; I don't know that
> this needs special treatment in the spec though.  If you disagree, I'm
> sure that my coauthors would be happy to take suggestions for
> improvements.
>